In EUROCRYPT 2012, Libert, Peters and Yung (LPY) proposed the first scalable revocable group signature (R-GS) scheme in the standard model which achieves constant signing/verification costs and other costs regarding signers are at most logarithmic in N , where N is the maximum number of group members. However, although the LPY R-GS scheme is asymptotically quite efficient, this scheme is not sufficiently efficient in practice. For example, the signature size of the LPY scheme is roughly 10 times larger than that of the RSA signature (in 160-bit security). In this paper, we propose a compact R-GS scheme secure in the random oracle model that is efficient not only in the asymptotic sense but also in practical parameter settings. We achieve the same efficiency as the LPY scheme in an asymptotic sense, and the signature size is nearly equal to that of the RSA signature (in 160-bit security). It is particularly worth noting that our R-GS scheme has the smallest signature size compared to those of previous R-GS schemes which enable constant signing/verification costs. Our technique, which we call parallel Boneh-Boyen-Shacham group signature technique, helps to construct a R-GS scheme without following the technique used in LPY, i.e., we directly apply the Naor-Naor-Lotspiech framework without using any identity-based encryption.
Introduction
Background: Group signature is a kind of digital signatures, proposed by Chaum and van Heyst [21] . In a group signature scheme, a group manager issues a membership certificate to each group user. Then, a signer, who has a membership certificate, can produce a group signature, and a verifier can verify whether a group signature was created by a group member or not, without identifying who the actual signer is. In order to capture a certain case, only the authority called "opener" can identify the corresponding signer of group signatures.
In many real situations, it is conceivable that signing keys will be leaked, or group members will quit. So, the revocation functionality is really desirable in practice. Currently, group signature schemes with revocation, which is called revocable group signature (R-GS), have been proposed. In particular, Libert, Peters and Yung [45] proposed the first scalable R-GS schemes, where all costs regarding signers is at most logarithmic in N , where N is the maximum number of group member. Their main technique to achieve scalability is to employ broadcast encryption, where the group manager publishes a ciphertext of a broadcast encryption scheme by indicating non-revoked members as authorized receivers, and then F is a group such that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption holds, different from G. 2 In the symmetric pairing (|G|, |Zp|, |F |) = (176 bits, 170 bits, 170 bits), and in the asymmetric pairing (|G|, |Zp|, |F|) = (170 bits, 170 bits, 170 bits). 3 In the symmetric pairing (|G|, |Zp|, |F |) = (512 bits, 256 bits, 256 bits), and in the asymmetric pairing (|G|, |Zp|, |F|) = (256 bits, 256 bits, 256 bits). 4 Power Diffie-Hellman Exponent assumption 5 Symmetric Pairing/ Asymmetric Pairing a signer needs to hide which ciphertext is selected, for achieving anonymity. 1 Therefore, even if the CS-based LPY scheme is directly constructed in the random oracle model, a signer is required to prove the same things, where the signer needs to hide the corresponding ciphertext but simultaneously needs to prove that the ciphertext is computed by the group manager, for proving the decryption ability of a broadcast encryption ciphertext. This procedure seems difficult to lead to an efficient R-GS scheme, and therefore an efficient R-GS construction in the random oracle model is still not obvious at all.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose the most scalable R-GS scheme secure under popular complexity assumptions (the decision linear (DLIN) assumption and the q-strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) assumption) with the help of random oracle. More concretely, (1) the scheme achieves the same efficiency as the LPY schemes in an asymptotic sense, i.e., all costs regarding the signer are at most logarithmic in N , and the signing/verification costs are constant (see Table 1 ), and (2) the signature size of the proposed R-GS scheme is roughly 10-times smaller than that of the LPY schemes [45] in 160-bit security, which is nearly equal to that of the RSA signature scheme (See Table 2 . The bit length for 80-bit security and 160-bit security is calculated by using the estimation of [22] ). Our techniques are explained as follows.
1. For revocation, we directly apply the NNL framework without applying the use of IBE or HIBE which is used in the original LPY schemes [45] . That is, the group manager publishes a revocation list containing signatures of non-revoked users.
2. In order to prove that a signer is not revoked, the signer proves that a signature corresponding to the signer is contained in the revocation list by using the Boneh-Boyen-Shacham (BBS) group signature [14] . The construction of the proposed scheme can be seen as parallel BBS group signature since the possession of both (1) a membership certificate and (2) a signature contained in the revocation list are simultaneously proved by the BBS group signature scheme.
3. In order to further reduce the signature size, we apply the randomness reuse technique due to Kurosawa [40] .
Our scheme is secure under the DLIN assumption and the q-SDH assumption. We additionally remark that asymmetric pairing setting is highly desirable in practice due to the recent novel works, e.g., [32, 7] . Therefore, we use the asymmetric pairing setting though the LPY schemes use the symmetric pairing setting.
Related Work: Many efficient constructions have been proposed, most of these schemes rely on the random oracle model [14, 3, 19, 37, 29, 24, 11, 55, 25] . Though most of them are based on discretelogarithm type assumptions, Gordon et al. [31] proposed the first group signature scheme from lattice assumptions. Later, Camenisch et al. [20] , Laguillaumie et al. [41] , Nguyen et al. [54] , and Ling et al. [49] proposed lattice-based group signature schemes with shorter group public key or signature size. Recently, Libert et al. [43] proposed a lattice-based group signature scheme with a simple joining mechanism. Boneh, Boyen, and Shacham [14] proposed an R-GS scheme where the group manager publishes a list containing membership certificates of revoked users, and only non-revoked users can update their membership certificate from the list. This technique was also applied by Delerablée and Pointcheval [24] , and Furukawa and Imai [29] . However, mainly there are two problems of this technique as follows. First, non-revoked users are involved in the revocation even when they are not revoked, and second, the membership certificate update cost is O(r). In order to get rid of signers' task of the update of membership certificate, Brickell [18] proposed the concept of verifier-local revocation (VLR), where no signer is involved in the revocation procedure. In the VLR technique, a revocation list is given to verifiers and verifiers check sequentially whether the signer is included in the revocation list. This technique allows that signing cost becomes independent of the number of revoked users, but the verifying cost is O(r). The specific constructions were proposed by Boneh and Shacham [16] , Nakanishi and Funabiki [51] , Libert and Vergnaud [47] , Langlois, Ling, Nguyen and Wang [42] , and so on. This VLR type technique can be used for the open functionality, and Bichsel et al. [11] constructed an efficient R-GS scheme without using encryption though the cost of opening depends on the number of users.
Though either the signing cost or the verification cost is O(r) in the above methodologies, Nakanishi, Fuji, Hira, and Funabiki [50] proposed the first R-GS scheme with constant both signing and verification costs. As one drawback of their construction, the public key size is O( √ N ). Later, Fan, Hsu, and Manulis [27] also proposed a R-GS scheme with not only the constant signing/verification costs but also the constant size public key, however, the size of revocation list is O(N ).
Recently, Kumar et al. [39] proposed a group signature scheme with probabilistic revocation. In their scheme, a token (which they call alias token) is contained in a group signature, and the same token is used when group signatures are generated in the same time period, i.e., these are linkable during a time period, and this model is different from the LPY model that we adopt in this paper.
In the research of security models, first, Bellare, Micciancio, and Warinschi (BMW) [9] showed that full-anonymity and full traceability are sufficient for (static) group signatures, and now the BMW model is widely recognized as the de-facto standard security model of the group signature area. Bellare, Shi, and Zhang (BSZ) [10] , and Kiayias and Yung (KY) [38, 36] independently extended the BMW model from static groups to dynamic groups. Later, Sakai et al. [58] showed that there is a room for improving the BSZ model since a signature hijacking attack is possible in the BSZ model, and proposed an extended BSZ model by considering a new security notion called opening soundness. In LPY papers [45, 44] , they extended the KY model by considering the revocation functionality (the LPY model). Recently, Bootle et al. [17] pointed out that in the previous models, a user may be able to sign messages with respect to earlier time intervals during which the user was not a member of the group. Note that they also gave a countermeasure, and it is also applicable to our scheme. Since our main aim is to implement the LPY scheme in the random oracle model, we adopt the LPY model in this paper.
Preliminaries
In this section, we review the complexity assumptions which our scheme relies on, the BBS+ signature scheme, and the complete subtree method. Let x R ← − X denote that x as being uniformly sampled from the set X , and x R ← − X denote that x as being sampled from the distribution of the random variable X.
Complexity Assumptions
Let G be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that takes a security parameter λ as input and generates a parameter (p, G 1 , G 2 , G T , e, g, h) of bilinear groups, where p is a λ-bit prime, G 1 , G 2 and G T are groups of order p, e is a bilinear map from G 1 × G 2 to G T , and g, h are generators of G 1 and G 2 , respectively. Here we use the asymmetric setting, i.e.,
The discrete logarithm (DL) problem is stated as follows: Given (g, y, p, G), output x = log g y. The advantage of an probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm A against the DL problem is defined as Adv
Definition 1 We say that the DL assumption holds if Adv
The q-strong DiffieHellman (q-SDH) problem is stated as follows: Given (g, (A i ) 0≤i≤q , h, h γ ), output (c, g 1/(γ+c) ) where c ∈ Z * p . The advantage of an algorithm A against the q-SDH problem is defined as Adv
Definition 2 We say that the q-SDH assumption holds if Adv
The advantage of an algorithm A against the DLIN problem is defined as Adv 
Definition 3 We say that the DLIN assumption holds if Adv

BBS+ Signature
We introduce the BBS+ signature scheme [29, 6] 
, h) then output 1, and otherwise output 0.
This signature scheme has unforgeability against chosen message attack (CMA) under the q-SDH assumption. For the formal security proof, see [6] . In our usage, we set L = 2.
Complete Subtree Method
Naor, Naor and Lotspiech (NNL) [53] proposed the subset cover framework that is a general technique for membership revocation and traitor tracing, and this technique is used for constructing broadcast encryption. This framework is implemented by two methods: Subset Difference (SD) and Complete Subtree (CS) method. Let N be the set of all signers, and R ⊂ N be the set of revoked signers. In such a case, the set of non-revoked users are divided into num disjoint sets where num is the number of subset. That is,
as the set of leaf nodes that have the same parent node v i . In [53] , it is proved that num ≤ r · log(N/r) in the case of the CS method, where num is the number of subset and r = |R|.
By using the CS method, we can construct a symmetric key setting broadcast encryption scheme as follows. A key is assigned to each node of a binary tree, and each user is assigned to a leaf node of the binary tree, and let {u 0 , u 1 , . . . , u ℓ } be the path from the root node to the leaf node. Then, the user obtains a key associated with each u j ∈ {u 0 , u 1 
Therefore, the user can decrypt the ciphertext using the key associated with the node u.
Definition of Revocable Group Signature
In this section, we give definitions of R-GS. We adopt the LPY model [45] which is a modification of the Kiayias-Yung (KY) model [38, 36] .
An R-GS scheme consists of the following six probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (Setup, Join, Revoke, Sign, Verify, Open).
Setup: It takes as inputs a security parameter λ ∈ N and the number of group member N ∈ N, and outputs the group public key gpk , the secret key of the group manager sk GM , the secret key of the opener sk OA , public information represented state Let cert i ⇌ gpk sec i denote that cert i and sec i are a valid certificate and a secret key by the execution of [J users (gpk), J GM (gpk , St, sk GM )]. We borrow this notation from the LPY model.
Correctness:
We say that a R-GS scheme satisfy correctness when the R-GS satisfy following requirement. 
Security Requirements: Here, we introduce the security requirements of R-GS. First, the notation and the oracles used in the definitions are given as follows:
• n = |St users | < N : The number of the group member.
• Sigs: The history of signatures issued by signing oracle. The form of each element is (i, t, M, σ), which means σ is the signature for message M in the epoch t by the signer i.
• U a : The set of the group members that collude with the adversary.
• U b : The set of the group members that do not collude with the adversary.
• O gpk , O GM , O OA : When these oracle are called, return gpk , sk GM , sk OA to the adversary, respectively.
• O a-join : The adversary executes Join with honest group manager, and the signer that collude with the adversary is added to the group. Then the number of users n is incremented and add the information of new signer to St = (St users , St trans ).
• O b-join : The adversary executes Join while colluding the group manager (this signer does not collude with the adversary). Then the number of users n is incremented and add the information of new signer to St = (St users , St trans ).
• O sig : It receives a query that is a message M and index i and returns ⊥ if i ∈ R t or i / ∈ U b , and otherwise returns σ for the signer i and epoch t.
• O open : It receives a query that is (M, σ) and epoch t, and returns the index of the signer i who generated the signature σ. • O read , O write : Reading and writing state I .
• O revoke : It revokes a signer from the group. It receives a query of signer index i ∈ St users and increment t, add i in R t and update RL t .
Next, we define anonymity, which guarantees that no adversary (who does not have sk OA ) can distinguish whether signers of two group signatures are the same or not.
Definition 4 (Anonymity [45]) Anonymity is defined by the following game Exp
Return 0. Next, we define non-frameability which guarantees that no adversary (who can corrupt the group manager and the opener) can produce a group signature whose opening result is an honest user.
The advantage of the adversary A against the above game is
Definition 5 (Non-Frameability [45]) Non-frameability is defined by the following game Exp
Return 0. Next, we define misidentification resistance which guarantees that no adversary (who does not have sk GM ) can produce a valid group signature whose opening result is in outside of the set of non-revoked adversarially-controlled users.
The advantage of A against the above game is
Definition 6 (Misidentification resistance [45]) Misidentification resistance is defined by the following game Exp
Return 0. 
Proposed R-GS Scheme
In this section, we give the proposed R-GS scheme. First, we explain our technique called parallel BBS group signature technique which is the core technique of our R-GS construction.
An NIZK Proof for Parallel BBS Group Signature Technique
In our R-GS scheme, each signer is associated to a leaf node of a binary tree. Let g, g 1 Let {u 0 , u 1 , . . . , u ℓ } be the path from the root node to the leaf node.
Then, the signer is issued BBS+ signatures {A j = (gh [1,ℓ] for all u j ∈ {u 0 , u 1 , . . . , u ℓ } as the membership certificate. A revocation list contains BBS+ signatures {B i,t = (gh
. . , u ′ num } is determined by the CS method. If a signer is not revoked, then there exist two signatures A j and B i,t that sign the same node u j = u i .
In order to describe our R-GS scheme, first, we show NIZK proofs which prove the possession of two BBS+ signatures and also prove the equality of the two signed messages. Since we use two BBS group signatures simultaneously, we call it the parallel BBS group signature technique. The fact to be proved is described as follows:
• A signer i has a membership certificate A j that proves "the signer belongs to the group." Let u j be the signed message of A j where u j ∈ {u 0 , u 1 , . . . , u ℓ }.
• A signature B j,t , whose signed message is also u j , is contained in the revocation list that proves "the signer who is a descendant of the node u j is not revoked at time t."
• A j held by the signer contains a secret key x, which is hidden against even the group manager (for non-frameability).
We prove the above statement as follows: Let θ = (A, η, ζ) be a BBS+ signature for the message (m, x)
The statement of the protocol, that proves that possession of (A, x) and B t such that m = m ′ , is described as follows. Let vk 0 = h γ 0 and vk 1 = h γ 1 be the verification key for the BBS+ signatures A and B t with m = m ′ , respectively, and H be a random oracle. The prover chooses α, β R ← − Z p and encrypts A and B t as follows:
As a remark, the prover needs to encrypt both A and B t since information of which A and B t are used helps an adversary to break anonymity in the proposed group signature scheme.
Moreover, we note that A and B t are encrypted using same scheme and its randomnesses are reused. This technique comes from Kurosawa's multi-recipient public-key encryption. This paper shows that randomness in the Cramer-Shoup encryption [23] can be reused for directing different messages to different recipients. We use this technique in order to encrypt a vector of messages. Intuitively, this might be reminiscent of the fact that under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, given g x , g y 1 , and g y 2 the two elements g xy 1 and g xy 2 look random elements. For further details, please refer to our security proof or the [40] paper.
Next, the prover proves that the value (α, β, x, m, η, η ′ , ζ, ζ ′ ) satisfies the following relation, where
The first line and second line, and the first line and third line are the statement of the BBS group signature scheme. This relations can be seen as parallel BBS group signature for A (the first line and second line) and B t (the first line and third line), respectively, where α and β are reused. As a remark, the equation ψ
is for proving the validity of αη (resp. αη ′ ). 2 Note that the value t is not a witness, since t (which indicates a revocation epoch in our R-GS scheme) is a public value.
Here, we give the NIZK proof which is constructed from a Σ-protocol for proving (α, β, x, m, η, η ′ , ζ, ζ ′ ) via the Fiat-Shamir transformation. Briefly, random values are chosen for each witness and R values are computed according to the relation to be proved. Note that the suffix appeared in random/R values indicate the corresponding witness. 
Proof:
. . , R ′ βη ′ ) then the proof π is accepted, and otherwise rejected. In the next section, we give the proposed R-GS scheme. In our R-GS scheme, A (generated in the Join algorithm) is a membership certificate and B (generated in the Revoke algorithm and contained in the revocation list) is a signature corresponding to non-revoked users.
The Proposed R-GS Construction via Parallel BBS Group Signature Technique
Here, the construction of the proposed scheme is described as follows. In our scheme, a signer is assigned to a leaf node, and let (u 0 , u 1 , . . . , u ℓ ) be the path from the root to the leaf. Then the signer is issued a membership certificate according to the path such that {A j = (gh [1,ℓ] . Moreover, if the signer is not revoked (at t), B i,t = (gh
+γ 1 is contained in the revocation list where u i = u j . Then, a group signature is computed shown in Sect. 4.1 by setting m = u j as a signed message of the BBS+ signature. Note that x (chosen in the Join algorithm) is known by a user only, and therefore no group manager can make a group signature instead of the user.
Setup (1 λ , N ): Choose (p, G 1 , G 2 , G T , e, g, h ) 
Revoke(gpk, sk GM , t, R t ): Determine the set of node {u
Sign(gpk, t, RL t , cert i , sec i , M ): If i ∈ R t then return ⊥. Otherwise, the signature is computed as follows. Since i ̸ ∈ R t , there exist (A j , x) and B j,t such that A j = (gh 
Security
The proposed scheme satisfies the following Theorems 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3.
Theorem 4.1 The proposed R-GS scheme has anonymity in the random oracle model under the DLIN assumption, where H is modeled as a random oracle.
Since anonymity means that no signer can be identified without opener's secret key, the attack on anonymity is equal to the attack on the encryption (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ 5 ) by which membership certificate is encrypted.Namely, the anonymity of this scheme is reduced to the CCA security of the linear encryption scheme [59] .
The concrete proof is given as follows. The proof proceeds with a sequence of games. First, we define the following games. In the following we denote by S i the event that in Game i the adversary successfully guesses the bit picked by the challenger.
Game 0. The initial game is identical to the game defined in the definition of admitter anonymity. We assumed that queries to the hash function are responded by the challenger. For this purpose the challenger maintains a hash list, which contains tuples of the form (M, ψ 1 
to compute the challenge. All the other components of the challenge is generated as in Game 1. This modification also does not change the adversary's winning probability non-negligibly, provided that the DLIN assumption holds.
Game 3.
In this game we modify the opening oracle to reject a signature (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ 5 , s 
, the challenger immediately rejects queries such that α + β ̸ = v, and all other queries are treated as before. This modification does not affect the behavior of the adversary, as the adversary can issue such as invalid query with a valid (that passes the verification) proof only with negligible probability.
Proof. We claim that the distribution (of the challenge) in Game 1 is identical to that in Game 0 except for cases in which the challenger outputs ⊥. This follows from a standard discussion of the simulation of zero-knowledge proof. To see this, we can observe that s * α − c * α in Game 1 corresponding to r α in Game 0, and similar correspondence holds for all other s * 's and r's. We can also see that both s * α − c * α and r α are uniformly distributed over Z p . We will then see that the challenger in Game 1 outputs ⊥ only with negligible probability. It can be obtained from the fact that (R Proof. We will describe a distinguishing algorithm B of the DLIN problem to bound the absolute difference | Pr[
, in which τ is either α+β or not, together with the description (p, G, G T , e, g, h) of the bilinear groups. The distinguisher sets up the scheme by choosing
Queries from the adversary A to the random oracle H are responded in the ordinary manner, that is, all fresh queries are responded with a random hash value and are recorded together with the hash value, while previously issued queries are responded in the same way as in the previous query. Opening queries are responded as specified in the scheme, that is, the distinguisher first verifies the NIZK proof and if the proof passes the verification, the distinguisher decrypts the linear encryption part (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ 5 ) using (ξ 1 , ξ 2 
, otherwise return ⊥. When the adversary requests a challenge regarding (i 0 , i 1 , M ), the distinguisher proceeds as follows: To compute the challenge (ψ * 1 , . . . , ψ * 5 , s * α , . . . , s * βη ′ ), the distinguisher flips a bit b, and sets ψ
is computed with the simulation algorithm as in Game 1. The distinguisher sends the challenge computed as above to the adversary. After receiving the challenge, the adversary further makes queries to the random oracle and the opening oracle, which are responded as before by the distinguisher. Finally, the adversary outputs the guess b ′ . The distinguisher outputs 1 if b = b ′ , outputs 0 otherwise.
Observe that when the distinguisher receives a random tuple (τ ̸ = α + β), the adversary's view is equivalent to that of Game 2. In contrast, when the distinguisher receives a linear tuple, we can see that the view is identical to that of Game 1, as the equation
holds. Finally, the lemma follows from the inequality Pr[
Proof. Since Game 3 differs from Game 2 only when a queried signature, when verified, produces the same (R α , . . . , R βη′ ) as the (R * α , . . . , R * βη′ ) used in the challenge phase, we examine the mapping ϕ :
, implicitly defined by the verification algorithm (notice that the mapping ϕ implicitly depends on the group public key and the signature to be verified), and argue that it is injective with overwhelming probability.
Since Proof. Game 4 differs from Game 3 when the adversary queries the opening oracle with a signature which is not rejected in Game 3 but is rejected in Game 4. We thus bound the probability that the adversary issues such a query. More precisely, the event we consider is that the adversary issues a signature σ = (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ 5 , s α , R β , R α+β , R A , R B , R αη , R βη , R αη′ , R βη′ ) such that: it is not rejected by the opening oracle, (ψ 1 , ψ 2 , ψ 3 ) does not constitute a linear tuple, and (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ 5 
is the group elements computed in Verify algorithm and (R * α , . . . , R * βη′ ) are the group elements used for generating challenge signature. If the adversary issues such a query to the opening oracle, there should be the query (M, ψ 1 , . . . , ψ 5 , R α , . . . , R βη′ ) in H (issued by the adversary explicitly or by the opening oracle for verifying the queried signature) such that (ψ 1 , ψ 2 , ψ 3 ) does not constitute a linear tuple, and the hash value H(M, ψ 1 , . . . , ψ 5 , R α , . . . , R βη′ ) coincides with the unique challenge c that is determined from the problem instance (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ 5 ) and the commitment (R α , . . . , R βη′ ). Hence for concluding the proof it is sufficient to bound the probability of this event. Noticing that in this case any query (M,
. . , R * βη′ ) which is used for backpatching, the output of H is chosen from Z p uniformly, and thus the probability that a query to H described as above exists with probability less Proof. Here we prove that in this game the value (ψ 3 are uniformly random even when conditioned on the adversary's view. To this end we examine the distribution of the adversary's view related to the randomness ξ 1 
under the condition where all the other randomness involved in the game are fixed. The adversary obtains information related 
(the rest of the calculation performed by the oracle is done without referring to
, which is what the adversary learns from this query. It in fact does not increase the information the adversary knows, since the above equation can be rewritten as (
be similarly obtained, when we write . The right-hand side of the equation shows that the response of the opening oracle gives no information to the adversary, since all the values that appears in the right-hand side are already known to the adversary.
The above discussion shows that the responses of the opening oracles do not leak any information
Finally we shows that the value (ψ
This can be done by considering the following equation
where t 1 = log g f 1 , t 2 = log g f 2 , and t 3 = log g f 3 . Since the matrix in the right-hand side has the deter- The discrete logarithm x of X in the membership certificate is the secret information that only the signer knows, and the signer issues the NIZK proof for the knowledge of x in the signing. Therefore, it seems that the signature cannot be forged without x. In the simulation of the adversary against the DL problem, the extractor of x can be construct by rewinding the adversary against non-frameability (this proof is based on the forking lemma [56] ). Therefore, the non-frameability of this scheme is reduced to the DL problem.
Proof. The adversary A comes up with a forgery (M * , σ * ) that opens to some honest user i ∈ U b and that did not issue a signature.
Given a problem instance (g, y = g x , p, G 1 ), the simulator B generates ( • O b-join query: When A (as group manager) requests to run Join protocol for a new honest user i in the group, B executes J user . Depending on the index of O b-join queries, B behaves as follows:
-If i = i * , B sends the value y = g x as X. In subsequent steps of the Join protocol, B proceeds as the real J user . When Join terminates, B obtain a membership certificate cert i = (⟨v i ⟩, {A j } ℓ j=0 , y).
• O revoke query: It can be treated as the real game, since B has sk GM .
• O sig query: When A asks a signature for a message M of the user i ∈ U b , B treats as follows:
can simulate the signing algorithm as the real game. , X) such that X = y = g x , we apply forking lemma [56] and obtain the discrete logarithm x of y = g x , then output x. Otherwise, B outputs ⊥ and halts.
For proving the theorem, we use the forking lemma [56] . 
The forking algorithm B corresponds with A is a randomized algorithm proceed as follows: (1) 
Let f rk(k) be the probability that B outputs 1. Then, the following equation
Next, we prove the following lemma by using the forking lemma.
Lemma 4.7
Adv
Proof.
Moreover, if A outputs forged signature, B outputs the discrete logarithm with probability 1/q b-join .
That is, [57] , where H is modeled as a random oracle.
The misidentification attack means a forgery of the BBS+ signature as membership certificate. Hence, the security against misidentification attacks can be reduced to the unforgeability of the BBS+ signature scheme, and it is proved in [6] . We consider two types of forgers: (1) forgery of the certificate for belonging to the group, and (2) forgery of the certificate of the non-revoked users. Since breaking the unforgeability of the BBS+ signature scheme allows us to construct an algorithm that breaks the q-SDH assumption, the theorem holds.
In the actual Join algorithm, a user sends X = h x 2 to the group manager, and the group manager, who has the signing key of the BBS+ signature scheme, can sign x without knowing x itself, and can make a certificate A. Whereas, in the security proof, the simulator needs to send a signed message x in order to access the signing oracle of the underlying BBS+ signature scheme. However, since an adversary sends not x but X to the simulator, we need to consider how to obtain the corresponding x in the security proof. To circumvent this obstacle, one solution is to add the proof of knowledge of the secret key in the beginning of the Join algorithm, and extract x by rewinding the adversary. However, we need to rewind the adversary a number of queried times. This requires much loose reduction cost, and it seems difficult to estimate the actual success probability of the extraction. Therefore, we introduce the knowledge of secret key (KOSK) assumption [57] where the adversary is required to reveal the secret key of the honest users, which is joined by O a-join queries. In addition, we assume that O a-join queries are not executed concurrently.
In type (1) forgery, we simulate a group manager who implements the join protocol. In this simulation, he/she gets X = h x 2 from a user and sends A j to the user. The group manager needs x = log h 2 X that is sent to the signature oracle in order to get signature A j . On the other hand, in type (2), we simulate a group manager who implements the Revoke algorithm. In this simulation, he/she can make B j that is a part of revocation list RL t without proof of knowledge.
Proof. The adversary A comes up with a forgery (M * , σ * ) that doesn't open to non-revoked dishonest user i ∈ U a \ R t * and that did not issue a signature. We will argue that the simulator B that breaks the BBS+ signature (which is secure under q-SDH assumption) can be constructed from the adversary A that breaks the misidentification resistance of the proposed scheme.
At the beginning of the game, B picks a random index j * ← {1, . . . , q join } of the O a-join query. We consider two types of adversary. Given a problem instance (g, w = h γ , p, G 1 ) (public key of the BBS+ signature), the simulator B generates ( • Type (1) forger: The adversary A forges a certificate A j * for that belonging to the group, which corresponds with O a-join queries.
• Type (2) forger: The adversary A forges a certificate B j * ,t * for that the non-revoked member, which corresponds with O revoke queries.
B interacts A as follows:
• O gpk query: B returns gpk as described above to A.
• O a-join query: When A requests to run Join protocol for a (corrupted) user i in the group, B executes J GM . B behaves as follows:
-Type (1) forger: When A sends a group elements X, A also sends x = log h 2 X (by the KOSK assumption). Then B asks the signing oracle of the BBS+ signature to generate a (part of) certificate A j = (gh
1 γ+η j . In the subsequent step of the Join protocol, B proceeds as the real J GM .
-Type (2) forger: It can be treated as in real game.
• O revoke query: When A asks to revoke the user i, B behaves as follows. (2) forger) . B outputs the decrypted certificates as the forged signature. Let the events that A of Type (1) and (2) 
Discussion on the construction of SD-based R-GS scheme
In this section, again we consider to construct a SD-based scheme in the random oracle model in an efficient way. By using the SD method, all (non-revoked) users are partitioned as S 1 , . . . , S num (as in the CS method) where num = O(r). Each set S j is described as S j := S k j ,k ′ j where k j and k ′ j are node of the tree of level ϕ j and ψ j , respectively. If a signer who has certificates of u 0 , u 1 , ..., u ℓ is not revoked, that the condition (1) k j = u ϕ j (k j is an ancestor of the leaf node that the signer is assigned) and (2) k ′ j ̸ = u ψ j (k ′ j is not an ancestor of the leaf node) must hold. The first "equality" condition can be proved as in our CS-method based scheme. However, it is not trivial to prove the second "inequality" condition where signed messages of two BBS+ signatures are different without showing messages themselves. In [44] , this inequality relation is proved by using the Boneh-Boyen signature with the form g 1/(k ′ j −u ψ j ) and Groth-Sahai proofs for the verification pairing equation of the signature. As mentioned in the paper, the languages of the Groth-Sahai proof and those of the Fiat-Shamir proof are completely different. This is the first obstacle.
Even if we can solve this problem, the next problem is efficiency (signature size). That is, we need to prove (at least) one more relation compared to the CS method based scheme. More precisely, in our scheme two BBS group signature schemes are run for A and B t , respectively, and we need to (at least) run one more BBS group signature if the inequality relation needs to be proved additionally. This means the signature size is at least 1.5 times longer than that of the proposed scheme. This is the second obstacle.
From the above discussions, it seems not trivial to efficently construct a SD-based scheme in the random oracle model. We leave it as a future work of this paper.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a scalable R-GS group signature scheme with compact signature size. In order to efficiently implement the scheme, we used the parallel BBS group signature technique where two BBS group signature schemes are simultaneously run but a part of random values are commonly used. By using this technique, we do not have to apply broadcast encryption which was used in the LPY schemes. Since random oracles break underlying algebraic structures, it seems not trivial to achieve constant certificate size [44] or constant revocation list [4, 52] without detracting the current efficiency. We leave it as an interesting future work of this paper.
